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Abstract[1]
In 1901, Chogyu Takayama (1871-1902), philosopher and
literary critic, published a short article entitled “On the
Aesthetic Life.” Takayama’s article, regarded as a manifesto of
Nietzscheism by his contemporaries, triggered a great debate
among a great many literary critics, including Shoyo Tsubouchi
and Ogai Mori. This paper argues that Takayama’s article
constituted a framework for aesthetic thought in modern Japan
and marked the Japanization of Western modern aesthetics.
Takayama was not interested in the modern Western idea of
autonomous art; instead, he tried to work out the aesthetic in
one’s way of living. What underlies Takayama’s idea of the
aesthetic life is, to my mind, a traditional Japanese view of art
according to which beauty is to be sought inside the world, not
beyond the world. In other words, the idea of the aesthetic was
decontextualized from its Western context of autonomous art
and recontextualized within the traditional concept of the art of
living. This is why his idea of the aesthetic life caused a
profound echo and became a keynote in twentieth-century
Japanese aesthetics.
Key Words
aesthetic life; art of living; the cognitive/the moral/the
aesthetic; art of being in the world; everyday object; gei-do
(the way of art); the absolute in the relative; habit; teaism
1. Introduction
Recently, Richard Shusterman (1949- ), an American
pragmatist philosopher, recalled the ancient idea of philosophy
as “an art of living,” thereby following Deweyan pragmatism
and aiming at overcoming “art’s modern specialization,” that is,
the dichotomy between art and life, and “recovering the
continuity of aesthetic experience with the normal process of
living.”[2] Seen from this perspective, aesthetic thought in
modern Japan has a striking characteristic or tendency of
denying any dichotomy between art and life. In this paper, I
will argue that the idea of the aesthetic life has constituted a
leitmotif of modern Japanese aesthetics.[3]
The idea of the aesthetic life is not foreign to Western thought.
Already in 1747, under the decisive influence of Alexander
Baumgarten (1714-62), the founder of modern aesthetics,
Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-77) introduced the concept
“aesthetic life of cognition” (das ästhetische Leben der
Erkenntnis, vita cognitionis aesthetica) that he held as the
“utmost beauty” of cognition.[4] Since then, the aesthetic life,
or to live aesthetically, has been addressed by several thinkers,
including Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) and Søren Kierkegaard
(1813-55).[5] Until recently, however, few studies have
historically and analytically elucidated the concept of the
aesthetic life.[6]
Aesthetics, in the modern sense of the term, was introduced,
or transplanted, into Japan in the late nineteenth century as
part of modernization or Westernization. At the turn of the
century, however, aesthetics as a discipline took root in the
Japanese intellectual world, which can be symbolized by the
debate on the aesthetic life that began in 1901 and continued
to 1903.
In 1901, Chogyu Takayama (1871-1902), philosopher and
literary critic, published a short but thought-provoking article
entitled “On the Aesthetic Life” in Taiyo (Sun), the magazine he
edited. His article triggered debate, one of the first great
debates in the field of aesthetics on the meaning of the
aesthetic life (biteki seikatsu), among a great many literary
critics, including Shoyo Tsubouchi (1859-1935) and Ogai Mori
(1862-1922). Takayama’s article, which his contemporaries
regarded as a Nietzschean manifesto, has usually been studied
either in relation to Takayama’s late position advocating
individualism and instinctivism or in the context of how
Nietzsche was received in modern Japan.[7] When viewed from
either perspective, however, the most important aspects of
Takayama’s article remained unnoticed. In what follows, I
argue that Takayama’s article constituted a framework for
aesthetic thought in modern Japan and marked the
Japanization of Western modern aesthetics.
Takayama was not an advocate for the modern Western idea of
autonomous art; he instead tried to incorporate the aesthetic
into an individual’s way of living. What underlies Takayama’s
idea of the aesthetic life is a traditional Japanese view of art
(gei or gei-do) according to which beauty is to be sought in the
world, not beyond it. That is, the idea of the aesthetic was
decontextualized from its Western context of autonomous art
and recontextualized within the traditional conception of the art
of living. This is why his idea caused a profound echo and
became a keynote in twentieth-century Japanese aesthetics.
2. A theoretical reconstruction of Takayama’s argument
In the beginning of his article, Takayama provisionally defines
the aesthetic life as “what serves life and body that are
superior to bread and clothes.”[8] His definition is somewhat
abstract and vague. We have to theoretically reconstruct his
argument to understand its specific content. Takayama uses
the word ‘aesthetic’ in contrast to the words ‘cognitive’ and
‘moral.’[9] This word choice shows his being influenced by neo-
Kantian philosophy.
Takayama reasons that “it is impossible to find a safe haven in
morality and cognition.”[10] That is, neither cognition nor
morality can attain something absolute because cognition is a
step-by-step process of questions and answers and morality is
inseparable from effort and, for this reason, presupposes
something immoral that must be overcome by effort.
Takayama, however, continues: “The ideal of morality must be
established without effort. … Being brought onto this stage,
morality is nothing other than amorality. It is beyond
consciousness, beyond reflection and beyond effort. It is a type
of habit or instinct.”[11] Takayama's examples of “following
one’s heart without going beyond the bounds” and of “the
singing birds” or “the flowers of the field” show that he takes
the position of moral intuitionism or sentimentalism, according
to which the true good consists not in unceasing effort but is
something immediately perceived and practiced.[12] He calls
the power that immediately perceives and practices the good
“instinct,” thereby equating instinct with habit, as second
nature, which indicates his position cannot be reduced to a
category of instinctivism, as is usually seen in the secondary
literature. Instinct, in Takayama’s sense, is not innate but
rather what was gained through human history and handed
down to future generations. Further, Takayama characterizes
instinct or habit as amoral because it is beyond moral
consciousness. Such amorality that lies beyond good and evil is
to be distinguished from immorality, which is still bound by the
dichotomy between good and evil.
Takayama’s position is not isolated. He shares the same
interest with the post-Kantians who were concerned with
overcoming Kantian dualism: Schiller, for example, by means
of aesthetic education, and Schelling, by means of aesthetic
intuition. Between 1790, when Kant’s Critique of the Power of
Judgment was published, and 1800, when Schelling’s System
of Transcendental Idealism was published, the aesthetic or
aesthetics became a watchword for the post-Kantians. It is no
wonder, then, that Takayama characterizes his position
aesthetic.
Takayama thus opposes the cognitive and moral life to the
aesthetic life, arguing that “the moral and the cognitive life
have only relative value in their nature, whereas the aesthetic
life has in itself an absolute value, in that it satisfies the desire
of human nature.”[13] That is, “the value of the aesthetic life is
absolute or intrinsic.”[14] Both the moral life and the cognitive
life are opposed to the aesthetic life as the relative, or
extrinsic, to the absolute, or intrinsic. What Takayama
understands under the rubric of the aesthetic life remains
unclear. He does not unambiguously state how the absolute
value is possible or what the desire of human nature or instinct
means.
In the following section, however, Takayama clarifies his
argument. He continues: “However, even what is not instinct
cannot be hindered from being aesthetic, as far as its value can
be regarded as absolute. Thus the realm of the aesthetic life
can be extended to more than what satisfies instinct.”[15] It
follows that Takayama’s position cannot be subsumed into
instinctivism. As examples of the aesthetic life, in the broad
sense of the term, Takayama enumerates six realms: morality,
cognition, money, love, yoga, and art. We consider morality,
the cognitive life, and the aesthetic.
First, morality has only a relative value but, if “one considers it
to have an absolute value and finds the final end of life in
performing morality,” one’s action is no longer moral but
aesthetic, as is seen in the situation of loyal retainers, devoted
sons, or valiant heroines.[16] Such an idea of aesthetic action
reminds us of Schiller’s critique against Kant. By reintegrating
freedom into beauty and duty into inclination, Schiller tries to
transcend Kantian dualism.[17]
Second, the cognitive life can be also regarded as aesthetic, as
far as the pursuit of truth becomes autotelic. Certainly, true
scholars would disagree with such autotelism of cognition but it
provides “a satisfaction that true scholars cannot acquire.”[18]
Finally, Takayama refers to “the poets and artists who
sacrificed themselves for what pleased them.” For Takayama,
being aesthetic and being artistic are independent of each
other and art is in itself only a means to some end. “Art for
life’s sake,” or even “art for instinct’s sake,” might be his
motto. Some artists, however, devote their lives to the ideal of
their art. “After all, art is their life, their ideal.”[19]
These examples demonstrate that while in Section 6 Takayama
dualistically opposes the moral and the cognitive life as
something relative to the aesthetic life as something absolute,
in Section 7 he relativizes his dualism between the relative and
the absolute, thereby finding the possibility of the relative’s
being treated as absolute or aesthetic.
I next address the three key points from Takayama’s article,
and show them anticipating aesthetic thought in the first half of
twentieth century Japan.
3. On the view of art implied in the idea of the aesthetic
life
The first point to notice is that Takayama relates the adjective
‘aesthetic’ to ‘life’ without limitation. This relation is not at all
self-evident. The underlying idea is to seek the aesthetic or
beauty not beyond life but within life. Such an attitude toward
the aesthetic originates from a traditional Japanese view of art
that is different from the Western modern view of art, for
example, art for its own sake.
Here we focus on The Book of Tea (1906), written in English by
Kakuzo (Tenshin) Okakura (1862-1913). In this book, Okakura
addresses Teaism (Chado in Japanese, literally, the way of
tea), explaining the Eastern view of art or, rather, worldview.
Okakura asserts that “the chief contribution of Taoism to
Asiatic life has been in the realm of aesthetics,” seeking the
essence of Taoism in the “art of being in the world,” the “art of
life,” or the “art of living” and thereby characterizing
teaism.[20] The art of being in the world is in refining the
ordinary act of drinking tea into an artistic form. Arthur Danto
would find here a kind of “transfiguration of the commonplace”
that is not guaranteed institutionally by the artworld of or
concerning teaism (that is, tea-world) but rather is practiced
by everyday aesthetic living.[21] It must be noticed here that
Okakura legitimizes the mundane as a root of teaism, or rather
Asian art in general, which underlies subsequent aesthetic
thought in twentieth-century Japan.[22]
Handicraft, along with teaism, closely relates to the mundane.
In this context, we have to consider Muneyoshi (Soetsu)
Yanagi’s idea of folk art or, in his words, “folk craft”
(Mingei).[23] In his lecture entitled “Beauty and Life” (1931),
Yanagi (1889-1961) notes that beauty in the modern era is
regarded as “something lofty” and that a “lofty beauty” is
sought in “what is far from life and not related directly to life,”
arguing that “not artworks, but craftworks closely connect
beauty with life.”[24] Yanagi further concentrates on teaism,
whose significance Yanagi claims lies in “finding the standard of
beauty in everyday objects," saying that “the tea masters had
the deepest opinions and experiences concerning the
relationship between beauty and life.”[25] In conclusion,
Yanagi postulates that “the everyday object is most important
for the aesthetic life and morality of human being.”[26] The
aesthetic life is not opposed to morality, as was Takayama's
perspective, but constitutes the humanity of human beings.
In the 1930s, Tsuneyoshi Tsuzumi (1887-1981) formulates the
idea of art not being separate from life as the “framelessness
between art and life.”[27] Tsuzumi, who is now quite forgotten
even in Japan, was probably the first Japanese to lecture and
publish books on Japanese aesthetics in Germany, in German.
Inspired by Georg Simmel’s essay “Picture Frame: An Aesthetic
Essay” (1902), Tsuzumi becomes conscious of Eastern,
especially traditional Japanese, painting lacking a frame,
drawing from it a general tendency of the Eastern view of art
or, rather, worldview: framelessness or, in German,
Rahmenlosigkeit, an expression he coined. The framelessness
in Tsuzumi's systematic theory of Japanese culture is threefold:
1) between nature and human beings (object and subject), 2)
between artworks and the outer world, or between art and life,
and 3) between individual art genres.[28] What is at issue in
our context is the second framelessness that pertains to art as
not a specific aesthetic phenomenon but a way of life related to
cultivation.[29] Tsuzumi further reasons that such “artification
(or aestheticization) of life” is especially exemplified by
craft.[30] In his later book entitled A Research into Artistic
Japan (1941), Tsuzumi notes the Japanese view of art that
does not draw a line between art and life originates from the
aesthetic life in the Heian period [794-1185].[31] Tsuzumi’s
thesis concerning the framelessness between art and life
culminates aesthetic thought in Japan originating from
Takayama’s thought-provoking idea of the aesthetic life.
4. On the absolute in the relative
The second point in Takayama’s article is that he not only
proposes but also relativizes the dualism of the relative and the
absolute. Here we begin by considering Okakura’s The Book of
Tea (1906), as we did in the previous section. For Taoism,
Okakura writes that “Its (= Tao’s) Absolute is the Relative,”
explaining thereby as follows: “The Present is the moving
Infinity, the legitimate sphere of the Relative. Relativity seeks
Adjustment; Adjustment is Art. The art of life lies in a constant
readjustment to our surroundings.”[32] That is, the absolute of
Taoism is not beyond this world because, apart from the
relative relationships of the finites to each other, an absolute
cannot exist. What is at issue is to adjust the finites within this
world so that they may co-exist with each other, which
Okakura calls the “art of life” or the “art of being in the world.”
Therefore, the absolute must be sought in our art of life, which
is the underlying idea of teaism: “The whole ideal of Teaism is
a result of this Zen conception of greatness in the smallest
incidents of life. Taoism furnished the basis for aesthetic ideals,
Zennism made them practical.”[33]
Motomori Kimura (1895-1946) most clearly formulates the idea
of seeking the absolute within the finite. In the following, I will
reconstruct his aesthetic theory based on his early article
entitled “The idea of artistic beauty in Hegel” (1931).
Kimura characterizes artistic creation as follows: “No one
recognizes miscalculation and bad actions as having positive
values by themselves. The situation is not the same, however,
with beauty.” If “a painted form is amended” by the painter
him- or herself, “between these two pictures there is, on one
side, certain progress concerning aesthetic expression and
artistic value; on the other side, each picture has by and in
itself a peculiar and unchangeable value.”[34] This means that
each stage of artistic creation simultaneously has a relative
value aiming at completion and an irreplaceable or
incommensurable value. A sketch for a work, for example, can
be appreciated as a preliminary step and as an end for itself.
This duality underlies artistic creation: “The essence of creation
or the nature of a work lies in seeking completion in infinite
distance and being completed in each finite instance... . What
is far away reveals itself in each instance of presence, this is
expression, this is the birth of a work.”[35] Kimura who began
his career studying the philosophy of German idealism,
especially Fichte, presupposes once a Kant-Fichtean position of
Sollen, seeking at the same time to transcend it, which Kimura
claims is possible in artistic creation because artistic creation
is, from one perspective, based on the Kant-Fichtean position,
in that it always denies the status quo and aims at a more
perfect future. From another perspective, artistic creation is
not a future-oriented process, in that each state has its own
undeniable value. Here we find a legitimate echo of the
thinking of post-Kantians, especially Schiller and Schelling.
In his article entitled “A Blow of Chisel” (1933), a manifesto of
his own aesthetic theory, Kimura writes: “A finite blow of the
chisel is immediately an expression of the infinite. That is, it is
filled and saturated with the infinite”; or even, alluding to the
Nirvana Sutra, “In a blow of the chisel is practiced the principle
that all beings have the Buddha-Nature.”[36] Kimura’s
aesthetic thinking certainly has a nirvanic background. What
does not follow, however, is that Kimura relies only on nirvanic
Buddhism. Rather, his confrontation with modern Western
thinking, especially German idealism, developed his awareness
of Buddhist tradition, reinterpreting and transforming anew its
original meaning in light of aesthetic thinking.
5. On habit as second nature
As we have seen in Section 2, Takayama’s theory of the
aesthetic life, which has often been considered as fostering
instinctivism, cannot be reduced to it. Neither does what he
calls instinct mean something innate and animalistic. Rather, it
is habit as second nature, that is, what was gained through
human history and is passed to future generations. In this
section, we focus on the idea of habit, showing how
Takayama’s idea of instinct as habit, or second nature, was
further addressed in the aesthetic thinking during the first half
of the last century.
First, we turn to Motomori Kimura’s theory. In the 1930s,
Kimura considers the meaning of body, addressing the
polysemy of the Japanese term mi, as follows: “The term mi
does have the meaning of body as a natural object, but it also
has the meaning of self as is expressed in the phrase ‘mi wo
omou’ (taking care of oneself), and even that of heart as seen
in the phrase ‘mi wo tsukusu’ (devoting one’s energies). Thus,
the human body is dialectic existence as subject-object. As a
subject making inroads into nature, it is an apical end of the
expressive will of a subject. Alternatively, as nature making
inroads into subject, it is a limitation of a subject by
nature.”[37] As is later the case with Hiroshi Ichikawa (1931-
2002) in his Structure of “Mi” (1984), the polysemy of the
word mi gives Kimura a clue to approach the peculiarity of the
human body, which Kimura argues is found in its mediating
between the inner and the outer, as is shown in the Japanese
term te-gokoro (literally, hand-heart). Te-gokoro means the
“heart that dwells in hands and works through hands.”[38]
What is to be noticed is that Kimura defined the actions of a
heart residing in a body as art, that is, technique. Art is a kind
of somatic intellect that indwells in hands, an intuitive
knowledge that delicately works in accordance with objects.
Kimura notes that there are many “expressions related to
body, in particular, to hands (te)” that describe the “forms of
art, ”for example, concerning working ways of technique, te-
ren (wiles), te-kuda (trick), te-giwa (dexterity), and te-sabaki
(manipulation); regarding technical properties of an object as
material, te-goro (handy) and te-gowai (stiff); and with
reference to the work of art as a synthesis of working and
material, te-no-konda (elaborate), te-garu-na (easygoing), and
te-wo-nuita (negligent). All these examples indicate that
human beings have not only an inner existence but also a
somatic existence.[39] Referring to Ravaisson’s theory in his Of
Habit (1838), Kimura explained the process in which technique
is gained as follows: “It is the will that first makes the hands
move. This process being repeated over and over, the hands
gradually become purposively habituated. Then we gain the
heart residing in the hands.”[40] Technique as the “naturalized
will that dwells in the body” is realized by habitual
practice.[41] That is, habit takes the shape of technique and
forms the core of a human being.
A theory of habit as technique can be also found in Kiyoshi Miki
(1897-1945), a contemporary of Kimura. In his Logic of
Imagination (vol. 3, 1939), one of his main works, Miki
examines technique as follows: “For homo faber, instruments
are ‘unconscious projections’ of organs, that is, a continuation
of body.”[42] Technique seems “closely adhered to our sensual
experience” and, therefore, a natural phenomenon for human
beings.[43] Miki argues, however, that “an invention of
instruments cannot be made by sensual experience; it needs
imagination.”[44] Whereas our sensual experience pertains
only to individuals, an invention of instruments presupposes
not only sensual experience but also imagination, which Miki
claims is a faculty of using symbols in Cassirer’s sense.[45]
That means a leap of imagination is needed for technology. At
the same time, an invented instrument must be used
unconsciously, that is, must become a continuation of body.
Otherwise, the instrument would not be worthy of being called
an instrument. This is why instruments are closely adhered to
our sensual experience and become parts of our body through
habit.[46]
Miki further argues that such operation of technique does not
belong exclusively to human beings. “All living beings exist in
an environment; by technically adjusting to an environment,
life produces form.” And, “in principle, human technique means
an adjustment between subject and environment.”[47] Now,
“the ground of all technique is movements of our body, which
has been, in turn, formed technically [in the process of nature’s
history].” We can say, therefore, that “human technique
continues nature’s technique.”[48] It follows that Miki’s theory
of technique aims at “understanding in a unified way human
history and nature’s history.”[49]
Technique that dwells in or inhabits the human body as habit in
the sense of second nature constitutes the basis of human
beings for Kimura and Miki. This conception of technique can
be regarded as the offspring of Takayama’s idea of instinct as
habit in his article entitled “On the Aesthetic Life.”
The question, then, is what the background of such conception
of technique is. Neither Kimura nor Miki clearly addresses this
question. To my mind, a traditional Japanese view of art (gei-
do; literally, the way of art) is one of the factors that enabled
Kimura’s and Miki’s conception of technique.
Here is Muneyoshi (Soetsu) Yanagi's theory of technique. In his
essay entitled “The beauty of the common object” (1926),
which can be regarded as a manifesto of his Mingei theory, he
considers a craftsperson’s speed bulk manufacturing. Such
manufacturing seems to lead only to a kind of inertia. Yanagi,
however, finds something positive in a craftsperson’s
repetition: “Repetition is the mother of expertism... . Hands
win the perfect freedom through this repetition.”[50] “Hands
winning the perfect freedom” means that the craftsperson is no
longer conscious of technique. Chogu Takayama would regard
this state as “beyond consciousness.”[51] Yanagi continues:
“Those who perfectly master the technique are beyond
consciousness of the technique. They are far from contrivance
and forget endeavor.”[52] That is, habit gained through
repetition makes possible true freedom or creativity, which is
beyond consciousness. Such an idea is based on the traditional
view of art.
Or we may refer to Tsuneyoshi Tsuzumi, who explains the
reason art was called the way of art in Japan: “The ‘way’
means that we are not satisfied with mastering the technique
and that we regard it rather as a means of polishing the whole
human being. The way, therefore, is related to cultivation in
the broad sense of the word; it is a way of life.”[53] That is,
mastering a technique leads to cultivating the whole human
being consisting of mind and body. Cultivation pertains not
only to our mind; it concerns the body’s mastering the
technique and aims at attaining a way of life. We could even
argue that our way of life is possible as a technique in the
sense of second nature. Seen from this perspective, we hear
an echo of Kakuzo (Tenshin) Okakura’s idea of art of living or
art of life that underlies his theory of art.
The question, then, is why we exercise or discipline ourselves
to master a technique. An exercise could certainly be, speaking
with Foucault in his Discipline and Punish, a discipline that
produces docile bodies. In this situation, mind controls body.
An exercise, however, does not solely shape the body into
passivity. It could provide us with a heightened, sharpened,
and more sensitized, body.[54] A heightened body is then able
to call creative acts from the subject or, rather, to stimulate
the subject to invent what it could not think of by its
autonomous mind, which testifies to the creativity of somatic
exercise for human beings.[55] This is why the art of living or
art of life can regenerate and innovate itself by the
interrelationship between mind and body.
In conclusion, the three key points taken from Takayama’s
article entitled “On the Aesthetic Life” constitute a framework
of aesthetic thought in modern Japan that, occasioned by the
encounter with modern European aesthetics, tried to
complement European aesthetics through reflecting on the
traditional tacit view of art in Japan. The idea of the aesthetic
was decontextualized from its Western context of autonomous
art and recontextualized within the traditional conception of
way of art. This is also why the concept of the aesthetic life
gained wide acceptance and constituted a leitmotif in modern
Japan.
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